Economic theory and asset bubbles by Gadi Barlevy
44 3Q/2007, Economic Perspectives
Economic theory and asset bubbles
Gadi Barlevy
Gadi Barlevy is a senior economist and economic advisor 
in the Economic Research Department at the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Chicago. The author thanks Marco 
Bassetto and François Velde for their helpful comments.
Introduction and summary
In the late 1990s, there was a dramatic run-up in the 
stock prices of various publicly traded U.S. firms, par-
ticularly those specializing in information technology 
and its applications. A similar run-up occurred in hous-
ing prices in the early 2000s. These episodes have of-
ten been cited by pundits as examples of “asset price 
bubbles.” Implicit in this description is the notion that 
the rapid growth in the prices of the assets in question 
over such a short period suggests these assets were over-
valued and thus at risk of a “correction,” or a sharp fall 
in price. In the case of the stock market, prices did in 
fact decline in 2000, with some indexes falling quite pre-
cipitously, as shown in figure 1 for the NASDAQ-100.1 
The slowdown in the growth of housing prices starting 
in the summer of 2006 has been offered by some as 
evidence of the beginning of a similar decline in the 
housing market.
Some of those who have identified these respec-
tive episodes as asset bubbles have also warned of the 
dangers in letting asset prices rise so rapidly. For ex-
ample, an editorial in The Economist magazine argued 
that “the risk is not just that asset prices can go swiftly 
into reverse. As with traditional inflation, surging asset 
prices also distort price signals and so can cause a mis-
allocation of resources—encouraging too little saving, 
for example, or too much investment in housing” 
(Economist Newspaper Limited, 2005). Quite naturally, 
this has led to calls for policymakers to rein in the 
prices of assets whose values appear to be inflated be-
fore they rise to astounding heights. Yet a number of 
studies have argued that policies designed to contain as-
set bubbles might end up doing more harm than good. 
One problem, highlighted in Cogley (1999), is that it 
is often difficult to assess whether an asset is overval-
ued, and so there is a risk of deflating assets that are 
not overvalued, possibly at great harm. Bernanke and 
Gertler (1999) raise a different issue, noting that using 
monetary policy to rein in asset prices may lead to 
unwanted deviations of inflation from its optimal 
path. They argue that monetary policy should focus 
exclusively on inflation, not asset prices.
In this article, I argue that, even absent the practi-
cal issues that other researchers have pointed out, poli-
cymakers would be wise to proceed with great caution 
before acting to stem asset bubbles. The reason is that 
economic theory suggests bubbles can only occur un-
der certain circumstances, and these circumstances 
may have relevance for whether acting to burst bubbles 
is desirable. For example, one set of circumstances in 
which bubbles may emerge is if markets are already 
distorted in other ways in the absence of a bubble. As 
is well understood by now, policies that are desirable 
when markets are efficient may turn out to be unde-
sirable when some markets are already distorted—a 
result dubbed by Lipsey and Lancaster (1956–57) as 
the “theory of the second best.” Even if policymakers 
could accurately identify an asset bubble and rein in 
its price without affecting other economic variables 
such as inflation, there remains the possibility that  
intervention by policymakers to rein in asset bubbles 
can exacerbate the very distortions that allowed the 
bubble to emerge in the first place.
I first discuss the way most economists would 
define asset bubbles and distinguish it from the way 
the term is often invoked in the popular press. I then 
summarize what economic theory tells us about when 
bubbles thus defined can occur. Lastly, I review some 
examples of economic models in which bubbles can 
occur and discuss the policy implications that emerge 
from such examples. Although the examples I review 45 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
are quite specialized and sometimes bear little resem-
blance to the type of episodes that originally prompted 
the concern about asset bubbles, they help to convey 
the reasons why bursting bubbles may not always make 
society as a whole better off and why, in some cases, 
such policies may actually make society worse off by 
exacerbating the distortions that cause the bubble.
What is an asset bubble?
As noted in the introduction, the popular press 
often uses the term bubble to describe a situation in 
which the price of an asset has increased significantly 
in such a short period of time so as to suggest that  
the price is susceptible to an equally sudden collapse.  
Academic economists have occasionally invoked this 
definition as well. For example, Kindleberger (1996, 
p. 13) defines a bubble as “an upward price move-
ment over an extended range that then implodes.” The 
rise and fall of the NASDAQ-100 Index in figure 1 
would certainly qualify as a bubble under this defini-
tion. Another episode that fits this description is the 
U.S. stock market in the 1920s. As illustrated in fig-
ure 2, the Dow Jones Industrial Average increased by 
almost 500 percent over the course of roughly eight 
years, from a low of 63.9 in August 1921 to a peak of 
381.2 in September 1929. Then, in just two days—
October 28 and 29, 1929—the Dow lost 24.5 percent 
of its value. The index continued to tumble over the 
next three years, reaching a nadir of 41.2 in July 1932 
from which it took 22 years to climb back up to its 
peak level in 1929. Other commonly cit-
ed examples of bubbles based on this def-
inition include the rise and fall in the price 
of tulip bulbs in seventeenth-century 
Netherlands (an episode often referred to 
as “Tulipmania”) and the rapid rise and 
fall in the price of shares in the South Sea 
Company and the Mississippi Company 
in the early eighteenth century.
However, most economists would 
find this definition to be problematic. 
Aside from the fact that it is inherently 
imprecise—the definition is ambiguous 
about how much the price of an asset 
must rise, or how quickly, in order to 
qualify as a bubble—large price swings 
sometimes occur naturally and benignly 
in response to shifts in supply and de-
mand. For example, new fashion accesso-
ries sometimes surge in price shortly after 
they are introduced, but eventually their 
prices fall. This pattern can be understood 
as follows. When a new fashion line is introduced, its 
supply will be limited because producers do not know 
which particular items will catch on and do not pro-
duce much of any given article. As the prices of the 
most coveted items begin to rise, producers respond 
by supplying more of them, causing their prices to 
fall. Eventually, consumers move on to new fashions, 
and the prices of the original line fall even further. 
While such prices would look similar to figures 1 and 
2, most economists would view such price swings as 
welcome and desirable rather than as cause for con-
cern. The initial high price of particular fashion lines 
signals to apparel manufacturers that they should pro-
duce more of them, and the subsequent low price sig-
nals that they should shift to producing other styles. 
By contrast, economists do view dramatic increases 
in the price of assets as a potential cause for concern. 
This is because the increase in price is sometimes so 
rapid that it seems unlikely to reflect real changes in 
the true value of the underlying asset. Instead of sig-
naling a genuine need for more such assets, as in the 
case of fashion accessories where there is greater de-
mand for one item as opposed to others, a bubble con-
veys the false impression that an asset is especially 
valuable when in fact it is not. Economists have at-
tempted to come up with a definition of bubbles that 
focuses on this aspect and thus distinguishes this phe-
nomenon from scenarios in which the price of a good 
or asset fluctuates because of cyclical changes in its 
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are sometimes labeled “fads” instead  
(see, for example, Camerer, 1989).
In particular, most economists would 
define a bubble as a situation where an 
asset’s price exceeds the “fundamental” 
value of the asset.2 Formally, the funda-
mental value is the expected value of all 
dividends the asset yields over its life-
time, properly discounted to reflect the 
present-day value of dividends paid at fu-
ture dates. Intuitively, an asset represents 
a claim to a stream of future payments. 
From society’s point of view, the value of 
an asset lies in the fact that it provides re-
sources, in the form of dividends, to the 
various people who will own the asset 
over time. If the price of the asset ex-
ceeds this value, it can be legitimately 
viewed as overvalued, since it would not 
be worth it for society as a whole to pay 
such a price to create an asset on the col-
lective behalf of all future owners of the asset. In 
many cases, the fundamental value of the asset is 
straightforward to define. However, there are some 
circumstances in which it is not possible to properly 
assign a unique fundamental value to an asset, al-
though it might still be possible to describe an asset 
as overvalued. I discuss this in more detail in box 1. 
Note that this definition does not presuppose that there  
is a run-up in the price of the asset. However, a rapid 
increase in the price of an asset may be a telling indi-
cator that an asset is overvalued, especially if there are 
no concurrently large changes in dividends or in news 
about future dividends. This definition also does not 
presuppose that the price of the asset must eventually 
crash. However, the fact that the price of an asset ex-
ceeds its true worth suggests there is nothing to justify 
its high price, and so the price is always liable to col-
lapse. To put it another way, there is always an equi-
librium in which the price of the asset suddenly falls 
to its fundamental value. Thus, economists distinguish 
an asset bubble not by what actually happens to the 
asset’s price, but by what could happen to it.
It is worth noting that for the price of an asset to 
exceed its fundamental value, astute investors who 
buy the asset should believe they might be able to sell 
it at some point in the future. This is because a forward-
looking investor would never purchase an asset worth 
more than its fundamental value with the intent of 
keeping it forever. If he did, he would be paying more 
for the asset than it would ever earn him in dividends. 
This feature will be important for understanding why 
bubbles can be ruled out in many circumstances;  
as we shall see, it is only under special circumstances 
that all investors can credibly believe they will even-
tually be able to sell the asset to someone else.
Although this definition of an asset bubble is 
simple enough, using it to identify bubbles in practice 
is difficult. This is because measuring the fundamental 
value of an asset is hard, especially since it depends 
on the expectations of dividends that have yet to be 
realized. Indeed, a coherent case has been made for 
each of the historical episodes described previously 
that the asset in question was not truly overvalued.3 
Are there any examples of bubbles that clearly meet 
this definition? Some economists would argue that 
money, or cash, should be viewed as a bubble. While 
not all economists agree with this view, and bubbles 
associated with money are indeed somewhat special, 
it is worth examining why money can arguably be 
viewed as a bubble. Working through the logic of this 
argument will allow me to explain some of the impli-
cations of this particular definition for bubbles and to 
set the stage for my discussion of why bursting a bub-
ble may not always make society better off.
To focus the discussion, I use a particular model 
of money, namely, the one proposed by Townsend 
(1980) and described in box 2. Essentially, Townsend 
describes money as a worthless asset that serves no 
purpose in either production or consumption; it is a 
piece of paper that yields no direct benefits from 
holding it. As such, it is akin to an asset that pays no 
dividends, which is also nothing but a piece of paper 
that entitles its owner to nothing and serves no other 
purpose. As such, the fundamental value of money 
FIguRE 2
Dow Jones Industrial Average, 1920–41
index










1920 ’22  ’24 ’26 ’28 ’30 ’32 ’34 36 ’38 ’40 ’4247 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
BOX 1
Formal definition of a bubble
In defining the fundamental value of an asset, it will 
be easiest to begin with the case of an asset that yields 
a known and fixed stream of dividends. Let dt denote 
the dividend income paid out by the asset at date t, 
where t runs from 0 to infinity. In order to value a 
dollar payment received in the future, let us further 
assume there are markets in which any trader could 
buy and sell bonds that pay off one dollar at any 
specified date. Let qt denote the current price of a 
bond that pays one dollar at date t. As long as all 
those who trade in the asset could also access the 
market for these bonds, each would equally value a 
dollar at date t and qt dollars today. Hence, the value 
any trader attaches to the dividend stream from this 
asset is given by
B1
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where F denotes the fundamental value of the asset. 
An asset bubble is an asset whose price P is not equal 
to its fundamental value (equation B1), that is, P ≠ F. 
Under fairly weak conditions, one can rule out the 
case where an asset trades for less than its fundamen-
tal value, which is why in the main text I define an 
asset as a bubble if its price exceeds its fundamental 
value, that is, P > F.
Next, consider the case where dividends are  
uncertain. That is, suppose that at date t, the state of 
the world can be one of any states in the set Ωt, which 
defines the set of all possible outcomes at that date, 
and let ωt ∈ Ωt refer to a particular state of the world 
at date t, which all traders believe will occur with 
probability Prob (ωt). The state of the world deter-
mines the value of the dividend at date t, that is, dt = 
d (ωt). Let qt = q(ωt) denote the value individuals as-
sign today to a dollar they receive at date t in the  
particular state ωt. To relate this to the price of a 
bond as in the case where dividends are known with 
certainty, note that if there were a market for state-
contingent bonds that paid a dollar at date t in a par-
ticular state, and this market were available to all 
traders, then q(ωt) would be the price of this bond. 
The fundamental value traders assign to the asset in 

































where the expectation is taken with respect to the 
distribution over all states of the world in Ωt. An  
asset would be considered a bubble if its price  
P ≠ F as defined in equation B2.
Defining the fundamental value of an asset be-
comes more complicated if we allow households to 
have different expectations about dividends or dif-
ferent access to financial markets. For example, 
suppose households hold different views about the 
likelihood of the different states in Ωt. In this case, 
the expectation in equation B2 will differ across 
traders, and there will not be a unique fundamental 
value that we can attach to the asset. However, as 
Harrison and Kreps (1978) and Allen, Morris, and 
Postlewaite (1993) point out, it is still possible to 
talk about an asset as unambiguously overvalued if 
it exceeds the fundamental value any trader in the 
market would assign to it—that is, if there is no 
trader who would be willing to buy the asset at the 
going price if he had to hold the asset forever and 
never sell it. Thus, we would define an asset as a 
bubble if its price P exceeds the value of F for each 
trader. In particular, in that case no trader would 
purchase the stock with the intent of holding it for-
ever; rather, traders would purchase the stock only 
because they expected to sell it at a later date with 
some probability.
Similarly, it might be the case that traders as-
sign different values to dollar amounts at the same 
state of the world. For example, if there were no 
markets for contingent bonds, or if only some traders 
had access to them, traders would typically discount 
the future at different rates. In this case, the expression 
in equation B2 would vary across traders because 
each assigns his own discount rates qt. Again, there 
may not be a single fundamental value across all 
traders, but we can still talk about an asset that is 
overvalued in the sense that it exceeds the funda-
mental value any trader would assign to it.
Finally, although I have treated qt and dt as given, 
these should in fact be viewed as endogenous se-
quences that depend on policy. When a policymaker 
uses policy to change asset prices, she might also 
change qt and dt. This point is discussed, for example, 
in Weil (1990). Once we acknowledge that the fun-
damental value of the asset itself can be affected by 
policy, one has to be careful about what it means to 
burst a bubble. For example, it might not be possi-
ble to burst a bubble without also changing its fun-
damental value. I ignore this issue in my discussion, 
although it is certainly a relevant consideration.48 3Q/2007, Economic Perspectives
BOX 2
The Townsend model of money
The Townsend (1980) model can be described as fol-
lows. There are two types of households, labeled A 
and B, each of which lives for infinitely many peri-
ods. Households of type i are endowed with yt
i units 
of consumption goods at date t. This endowment 



















That is, the total endowment is always 1, but the two 
types alternate as to which receives it. Both types  












where U(⋅) is a concave, increasing, and differentia-
ble function. Assume further that U′(0) = ∞, which 
implies households would want to consume at least 
some goods in each period.
In each period, both types of household must 
choose consumption ct and money holdings for the 
next period Mt+1 to maximize their utility. Money 
holdings are restricted to be positive; that is, money 




















subject to the budget constraint
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where pt is the price of consumption goods at 
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Townsend analyzes various aspects of this model. 
One of these is the existence of an equilibrium when 
the price of goods pt is fixed over time. He shows that 
there is indeed such an equilibrium. In this equilibri-
um, a household endowed with one unit of consump-
tion goods will trade a fraction λ of it in exchange for 
money, and in the period where it is not endowed 
with consumption goods, it will trade all of the mon-
ey it holds for goods, where given constant prices 
will be equal to λ. The value of λ solves the equation
U′(1 – λ) = βU′(λ).
Since β < 1 and U (⋅) is concave, one can show that 
λ < 1/2; that is, households consume more when their 
endowment is high. This equation explains why house-
holds expect to earn a capital gain from buying money: 
The marginal utility of the consumption goods they 
give up when they buy money is lower than the mar-
ginal utility of the consumption goods they purchase 
when they sell their money holdings, and so they 
realize a capital gain in utility from this transaction.
To see how money in the model can be viewed 
as the present discounted sum of quasi dividends, 
let λt
i  denote the Lagrange multiplier on the budget 
constraint (equation B3) andθt
i the multiplier on the 
nonnegativity constraint (equation B4). The first or-
der conditions for households of type i imply that
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Repeatedly substituting forward for λt+1 from equa-
tion B5 yields











i  is the value the household i attaches to a 
marginal unit of money, the similarity between 
equation B6 and equation B1 (in box 1) naturally 
suggests an interpretation in which the value of 
money to a household is equal to the present dis-
counted value of a stream of “dividend” payments 
θt, where θt represents the transaction services the 
household obtains from money. While this provides 
an intuitive explanation for the value of money, it 
is also somewhat misleading. A positive “dividend”  
θt at date t reflects the fact that an optimizing house-
hold would trade away money at that date if it re-
ceived it, and thus achieve a utility gain (since it 
wants to have a negative value of Mt). It does not 
represent a dividend payment that a household would 
receive simply from holding on to the asset for a pe-
riod, in line with what a true dividend payment re-
flects. Hence, although one can interpret the value 
households attach to money in the model as the dis-
counted value of certain quasi dividends, this does 
not contradict the fact that money in Townsend’s 
model can be viewed as a bubble.49 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
should be zero, and the fact that buyers and sellers 
are willing to trade valuable goods for money implies 
its price exceeds its zero fundamental value.
The notion that money can be viewed as a bubble 
may strike some readers as odd. The classic example 
of a bubble is an asset whose price rises rapidly, en-
couraging investors to buy it, even though it is over-
valued, because they can turn around and sell it at a 
higher price than they bought it at. At first glance, there 
does not seem to be an obvious analogue to this in the 
case of money.4 For example, in a world with a con-
stant price level over time, a household would give 
up just as many goods to buy a dollar as it can purchase 
with that dollar. So in what way is money providing a 
capital gain to a seller who trades his goods and ser-
vices for money? Here, Townsend’s model reveals that 
money does in fact accrue a capital gain, but one which 
is measured in utility terms rather than financial terms. 
In particular, for reasons inherent to the Townsend 
model and which are explained in box 2, households 
value goods more when they trade money for goods 
than when they trade goods for money. Thus, they 
buy money with “cheap” goods and turn around and 
sell it for “valuable” goods, just as a speculative trad-
er might buy an overvalued asset at a lower price than 
he plans to sell it at. More generally, monetary models 
tell us that when households hold money, they are 
trading goods they own but do not like very much for 
money, and later they trade this money for different 
goods they like more than the goods they sold. These 
gains would be reflected in the way a household per-
sonally values goods, not in the market price of goods. 
But these gains are no different in principle than the 
capital gains one could earn on a stock: Each house-
hold buys money with something that gives it low 
utility, then turns around and sells money for some-
thing that gives it high utility.
Another feature of money that might make it seem 
odd to refer to it as a bubble is that money does play 
a useful role, specifically by facilitating transactions. 
This value should presumably be counted as part of 
the inherent value of money. Indeed, as discussed in 
box 2, the value a household in Townsend’s economy 
attaches to money is precisely equal to the present 
discounted value of the transaction services money pro-
vides to that household. So why does it make sense to 
think of money as overvalued? The issue rests largely 
on the definition of dividends. A dividend for an asset 
is typically defined to be the benefits an owner of an 
asset accrues from retaining ownership of the asset, net 
of any changes in the price of the asset. In Townsend’s 
model, these benefits are exactly zero.5 It is only when 
the household sells money for goods that the household 
becomes better off, which ought to be counted as a 
capital gain. Of course, if we adopt a more expansive 
view of dividends according to which money’s trans-
action services would be counted as dividends, we 
would not choose to define money as a bubble. But the 
fact that it is possible to view money as a bubble is 
instructive. In particular, as I discuss later in this article, 
the reason money plays a useful role in Townsend’s 
model is that it serves to mitigate a distortion that is 
inherent to Townsend’s economy, and it is this very 
distortion that allows money to exist in the first place. 
If bubbles occur in environments in which there are 
already distortions, eliminating the bubble may not 
always be socially desirable. 
For the remainder of this article, I use the term 
bubble to refer to an asset whose price cannot be jus-
tified by the value of the dividends that society expects 
to earn from this asset class collectively. This defini-
tion says nothing about the rises and falls in asset prices 
that characterized the most prominent historical epi-
sodes often identified as bubbles, but it does capture 
the oft-cited notion that during these episodes asset 
prices seemed to have become temporarily unhinged 
from their true worth.
When can asset bubbles arise?
The idea that asset prices can assume arbitrary 
values rather than reflect their underlying worth is 
rather disturbing. Not surprisingly, economists have 
sought to determine whether this possibility can be 
ruled out. There are in fact various conditions that can 
be used to rule out the existence of bubbles on theo-
retical grounds. This section reviews the results for 
when bubbles can and cannot occur, with the purpose 
of eventually exploring what the conditions necessary 
for bubbles to emerge imply for the desirability of 
setting out to keep the prices of bubbles in check.
A natural starting point for a discussion of when 
bubbles can emerge is a paper by Milgrom and Stokey 
(1982). They consider the distinct but related ques-
tion of whether it is possible for agents to engage in 
“speculative trading” in one-shot markets. To under-
stand their result, consider an example of a stock that 
can be traded today and then never again. Two inves-
tors, Alice and Bob, participate in the market, and ini-
tially Bob owns all of the stock. Suppose that after 
doing research on the company, Alice decides that the 
company is likely to be profitable and pay out high 
dividends. At the same time, Bob decides after doing 
his own independent research that the company is 
likely to be unprofitable and pay out low dividends. 
Milgrom and Stokey asked whether Bob and Alice 
would agree to trade the asset, with each speculating 50 3Q/2007, Economic Perspectives
that they will be benefiting at the other’s expense. 
This question does not bear directly on the existence 
of asset price bubbles, which crucially depends on the 
possibility of resale. Nevertheless, this question is re-
lated to the possibility of bubbles. In particular, investors 
who purchase an overvalued asset are also speculat-
ing that they will be able to sell the asset to another 
trader in the future. As such, they must believe they 
will be able to sell the asset for more than the divi-
dends it will pay future owners of the asset. This is 
similar to the way Bob expects to sell Alice an asset 
for more than he believes it is worth. Not surprisingly, 
the conditions that rule out speculative trade between 
Alice and Bob in this example can also rule out the 
existence of asset bubbles.
Milgrom and Stokey argue that in their example, 
speculative trade will not be possible under certain 
circumstances. This is because the fact that the other 
party is willing to engage in trade will convince both 
Alice and Bob that they may have failed to take into 
account some information about the asset that the other 
side has access to. This would dissuade both sides 
from completing the trade, even if they never actually 
see the information of the other party. The formal argu-
ment that rules out speculative trade requires several 
assumptions. First, all traders must share the same 
initial beliefs about the company before they engage 
in research.6 Second, before trade occurs, the stock is 
assumed to have been allocated efficiently. That is, 
there would have been no reason for Alice to buy the 
stock from Bob back when both of them shared the 
same initial beliefs about dividends. This is important, 
since without this assumption Bob would not be able 
to tell whether Alice was willing to buy the stock be-
cause she has favorable information about dividends 
or because she simply has a greater preference for own-
ing the asset. Finally, all traders are assumed to be  
rational and profit maximizing, and this is commonly 
known by all traders. That is, not only are Alice and 
Bob rational, but they know each other to be rational, 
they know that the other trader considers the counter-
part to be rational, and so on. If all of these conditions 
are satisfied, Alice and Bob will not trade.
Around the time Milgrom and Stokey published 
their result on speculative trade, Tirole (1982) sepa-
rately showed that a similar set of assumptions can 
rule out the possibility of asset bubbles. As in Milgrom 
and Stokey, Tirole (1982) assumed that traders start 
out with a common set of beliefs, that it is common 
knowledge that all traders are rational, and that re-
sources are allocated efficiently prior to trading. In 
addition, Tirole (1982) assumed there are only finitely 
many traders who can trade in the asset, although 
each can trade it infinitely many times. Under these 
assumptions, Tirole showed that asset bubbles could 
not occur. The intuition is as follows. The assumption 
that the initial allocation of resources is efficient im-
plies there is no mutually advantageous trade between 
the agents. As a result, any investor who agrees to buy 
an overvalued asset must believe that doing so bene-
fits him at the expense of remaining traders taken as a 
whole. In particular, he expects to gain at their expense 
by selling them a stream of dividends for more than it 
is worth. When there are only finitely many traders, 
these beliefs cannot all simultaneously be true: If  
everybody who buys the overvalued asset expects to 
benefit at the expense of all other traders, there won’t 
be any traders left from whom to actually benefit. The 
argument is analogous to why the children in Garrison 
Keillor’s fictional town of Lake Wobegon cannot all 
be above average as its residents claim, since deviations 
from the average have to sum up to zero. Likewise, 
not all traders can expect to gain at the expense of all 
remaining traders taken together, since the expected 
gains of all traders together have to sum up to zero.
For an asset bubble to occur, then, at least one of 
Tirole’s (1982) assumptions must be contradicted:  
The potential number of traders who trade in the asset 
is infinite, traders start out with different prior beliefs 
or they believe other traders are irrational, or there 
must be some inefficiency in the economy prior to the 
initiation of trade.7 I now consider each of these sce-
narios in turn. 
Infinitely many traders
If there are infinitely many potential traders, then 
the argument for why bubbles could not exist sketched 
earlier fails. Suppose each investor buys the asset, sells 
it to someone else, and then leaves the market. The 
first person believes he benefits at the expense of all 
the traders that come after him, since they pay him 
more than he gives them in dividends. The second 
trader similarly believes that he will benefit at the ex-
pense of all traders who come after him, and so on. 
Since we never reach a last trader, we never reach a 
contradiction. To borrow an analogy from Tirole (1982), 
investing in a bubble amounts to a game of “hot pota-
to” in which each person tries to pass on an overval-
ued asset to somebody else so as not to get stuck with 
a stream of dividends worth less than what he paid 
for it. With only finitely many people, the last person 
in line will refuse to buy the asset. But then the person 
before him will refuse to buy the asset, knowing he 
will be stuck with it. By the same logic, no investor 
would ever agree to invest in an overvalued asset.  
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hands to which to pass the hot potato. Various exam-
ples of such bubbles are formally demonstrated in  
Tirole (1985). However, the fact that a bubble can 
arise when there are infinitely many people who can 
trade the asset was demonstrated much earlier, most 
notably in early work on monetary economics such  
as Samuelson (1958).
Requiring that there be literally infinitely many 
traders seems like an odd condition to rely on for the 
existence of bubbles. Indeed, Santos and Woodford 
(1997) have argued that bubbles that hinge on infi-
nitely many traders are both exceptional and fragile, 
in the sense that they typically will not survive slight 
modifications in the underlying environment. Another 
potential problem with relying on infinitely many traders 
to sustain a bubble is that since an asset must poten-
tially pass through infinitely many hands, the econo-
my must grow at least as fast as the bubble to ensure 
that there are enough resources to keep trading the as-
set. Without this assumption, only finitely many trad-
ers will be able to buy the asset, and then Tirole’s (1982) 
original argument for the non-existence of bubbles 
would apply. Abel et al. (1989) propose a way to test 
whether the growth rate of the economy is large enough 
to accommodate an asset bubble, and find that this 
condition has never been satisfied in the U.S., includ-
ing the period of the rise and crash of stock prices 
throughout the 1920s depicted in figure 2.
Differences in initial beliefs and the possibility  
of irrational traders
If all traders begin with the same initial beliefs about 
the fundamental value of the asset but then conduct 
their own independent research to learn more about 
the true fundamental value, the logic of Milgrom and 
Stokey (1982) rules out the possibility that two trad-
ers starting with the same initial beliefs would come 
to believe that they can each benefit at the expense of 
the other. But if traders have different initial beliefs 
or else believe that other traders are irrational, a trad-
er might think that as long as there are other traders 
with incorrect beliefs, he can profit at their expense 
because they mistakenly fail to realize they are being 
taken in when they buy the asset.
Various papers have formally demonstrated how 
these conditions can lead to the existence of bubbles. 
One such paper is Harrison and Kreps (1978). They 
assume that traders begin with different initial beliefs 
and then stick to their beliefs regardless of what oth-
ers believe and regardless of what they observe about 
dividends. One of their results shows that an asset can 
trade for more than what any one trader in the economy 
believes the fundamental value should be, even the 
trader with the most optimistic view of dividends. 
Traders are willing to engage in trade in an asset they 
believe is overvalued because they all believe (at least 
some of them mistakenly) that by trading the asset 
they can profit at the expense of others. Another paper 
that follows this approach is De Long et al. (1990). 
They assume that both rational and irrational traders 
participate in asset markets. Unlike in Harrison and 
Kreps (1978), there is no restriction that irrational 
traders must believe their strategies to be profitable. 
Rational traders would have an incentive to take ad-
vantage of arbitrage opportunities when assets are 
mispriced, but because they are assumed to be risk 
averse and to have short time horizons, they will not 
drive the price of an overvalued asset down to its fun-
damental value, and bubbles can exist.
There are several empirical findings that support 
the notion that bubbles are associated with the possi-
bility of at least some traders committing systematic 
mistakes in their trades. On the one hand, many of the 
historical episodes of bubbles cited previously seem 
to coincide with the entry of unsophisticated traders 
into their respective markets. This view is summa-
rized in White (1990), who writes: 
During the tulipmania, Garber notes that the 
middle classes and even monied workers began 
to speculate in the market for tulips, which pre-
viously had been the province of specialists.  
In their enthusiasm to participate, new investors 
seem incredibly incautious. ... In 1873, new  
German investors played a prominent role. They 
busily acquired new, untested foreign securities 
for their portfolios. In the 1920s the shift in busi-
ness financing from short-term commercial bank 
loans to bonds and stocks meant that instead of 
commercial banks who had considerable experi-
ence in evaluating firms, the general investing 
public became the chief creditors of corpora-
tions. Americans who had never owned stocks 
before were now buying. Given the increased 
difficulty of evaluating fundamentals and the 
general optimism from the decade of prosperity, 
it is not surprising that prices were pushed above 
fundamentals. Similarly in the 1980s, new finan-
cial instruments drew in new investors from both 
at home and abroad. (p. 238)
Further support for this view of why bubbles can 
occur comes from controlled experiments in which 
test subjects (typically undergraduate students) were 
allowed to trade assets in simulated markets. The best 
known example is Smith, Suchanek, and Williams 
(1988). They set up an experiment in which subjects 
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explicitly described to all participants prior to the ex-
periment. Subjects were paid according to the wealth 
their trading strategies netted in each experiment, 
providing them with an incentive to trade optimally. 
Since all traders were given the same information by 
design, there should not have been a bubble. Never-
theless, assets in their experiment traded above their 
fundamental value, first rising above the fundamental 
value and then crashing back down to it as the asset 
reached the end of its life. This suggests either that 
the test subjects failed to correctly compute the true 
value of the asset, or else they believed other subjects 
would compute the value incorrectly and so one could 
trade profitably at the expense of such subjects. Sub-
sequent work by Lei, Noussair, and Plott (2001) finds 
some support for the former explanation, since bubbles 
occurred even when participants were told they could 
not resell an asset after they bought it. Since preclud-
ing resale precludes the possibility of exploiting other 
traders, a bubble could occur in such a market if trad-
ers fail to calculate the fundamental value of the as-
set. That said, Smith, Suchanek, and Williams (1988) 
find that once participants have some experience trad-
ing in these experimental markets, bubbles no longer 
emerge. Following up on this finding, Dufwenberg, 
Lindqvist, and Moore (2005) argue that bubbles fail to 
emerge in laboratory settings where at least one-third 
of the traders in the experiment are experienced. This 
lends support to the view that uninitiated traders do in 
fact make mistakes. What is less clear from the ex-
periments is whether experienced traders are willing 
to speculate on buying overvalued assets when they 
believe there are many uninitiated traders active in 
the market to exploit.
Thinking about how to deal with bubbles that 
arise because some traders make systematic mistakes 
is tricky. First, if traders disagree over the true value of 
an asset, it is not obvious what policymakers should 
believe about the asset. For example, in Harrison and 
Kreps’ (1978) framework, all traders are firmly con-
vinced that their beliefs are correct. Clearly, at least 
some of them must be wrong. So how confident should 
policymakers be that their own beliefs are correct? 
One compromise might be to wring out at least some 
excesses by driving down the price of the asset to the 
most optimistic assessment any trader has. However, 
it is not clear that this in itself is desirable. Moreover, 
driving down the price of the asset may be infeasible 
or counterproductive. One of the points in Harrison 
and Kreps (1978) is that, given the conflicting beliefs 
of the traders in their model, the price of the asset has 
to exceed the value all traders assign to that asset for 
the market to clear. Simply driving down the current 
price of the asset might encourage some investors to 
buy more of the asset and bid its price back up. In ad-
dition, as long as traders maintain different beliefs 
about the underlying dividends, they will always have 
an incentive to engage in speculative trade. Even if 
policymakers were committed to keeping the price of 
a particular asset contained indefinitely, traders with 
different beliefs would still want to engage in specu-
lative trades, possibly in other markets.
To the extent that bubbles are caused by naive 
traders’ failure to assess the fundamental value of an 
asset correctly, as some of the historical evidence might 
suggest, policymakers might be able to rein in bubbles 
by educating these traders about the true value of the 
asset. There may be some wisdom to doing this. How-
ever, in a certain sense this intervention amounts to 
redistributing wealth from one party to another, name-
ly, from traders who incurred the cost of acquiring in-
formation about the asset to uninformed traders who 
enter the market. On its own, this would be a poor 
justification for public policy, since policy should aim 
to benefit society at large and not some group at the 
expense of others. Indeed, even where government 
policies are aimed at curtailing abuse against certain 
parties, they are usually motivated by a desire to ben-
efit all of society. For example, regulation to limit 
collusion by producers is viewed as serving the public 
interest because collusion involves inefficiently low 
levels of production, not because it favors consumers 
over producers. There may be similar reasons why it 
is inefficient to let informed traders exploit uninformed 
traders. But a compelling justification for bursting 
bubbles would require an explicit argument for why 
this should make society as a whole better off. 
Inefficiency
The final scenario in which bubbles can occur is 
if resources are allocated inefficiently in the absence 
of a bubble. Consider once again the Townsend (1980) 
model described in box 2. The economy consists of 
two types of households, each of which lives for infi-
nitely many periods. In each period, households receive 
some endowment of consumption goods. Different 
types of households will receive different endowments. 
In even periods, households of type 1 receive all of 
the consumption goods available in the economy and 
households of type 2 receive none. In odd periods, 
households of type 2 receive all of the goods available 
and households of type 1 receive none. Thus, the for-
tunes of any given household fluctuate over time. Both 
types of households are assumed to prefer consuming 
the same amount on average every period to consum-
ing more in some periods and less in others. But by 53 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
assumption, goods cannot be stored, there are no oth-
er assets in the economy, and households are unable 
to commit to long-term contracts with one another. 
This model satisfies all of the assumptions in Tirole’s 
(1982) model except for the requirement that the ini-
tial allocation is efficient. In particular, all households 
would prefer a situation in which they could trade 
claims on each other’s endowments so as to achieve  
a flat consumption profile to being forced to consume 
whatever their endowment is in each period. 
Townsend (1980) used this model to provide a 
theory for the existence of money. But as I alluded to 
earlier, we can reinterpret his results as an example of 
an asset price bubble. In particular, suppose we intro-
duce an asset that pays no dividends into this econo-
my. Although the fundamental value of this asset is 
zero, Townsend’s results imply that it will be possible 
for this asset to trade at a positive price. In particular, 
households that are rich (that is, those that receive an 
endowment today) will trade some of their endowment 
in exchange for the asset, while households that are 
poor (that is, those that do not receive an endowment 
today) will trade any of the asset they own for goods. 
In this case, the asset would trade back and forth be-
tween the two types of households at a positive value. 
The asset plays the role of money in that it allows house-
holds to sell excess goods today in the hope of trad-
ing the asset for goods tomorrow. To understand why 
Tirole’s (1982) non-existence result breaks down, note 
that since the initial allocation is inefficient, an inves-
tor who considers buying an overvalued asset no lon-
ger has to believe that to gain from trade he must benefit 
at the expense of another trader. When a household 
that is rich buys the asset and then sells it again when 
it is poor, it is not exploiting the rich household it 
sells the asset to; rather, the rich household wants to 
buy the asset because it wishes to hold it now and trade 
it in the future. By contrast, Tirole’s (1982) argument 
ruled out asset bubbles because all traders had to si-
multaneously believe they were taking advantage of 
other traders.
One of the features of Townsend’s model is that 
the asset bubble can be traded infinitely many times. 
This feature is essential in his model, since otherwise, 
households would refuse to purchase an overvalued 
asset in the last period, knowing that there would be 
no opportunity to sell it again. But then in the previ-
ous round of trading no investor would agree to pur-
chase the asset if it were overvalued, knowing he 
would be unable to sell it at a profit, and so on. The 
infinite nature of the model might seem essential for  
a bubble to exist. However, this would be an incorrect 
conclusion, as demonstrated by Allen, Morris, and 
Postlewaite (1993). They provide an example of a 
bubble in an environment where the initial allocation 
of resources is inefficient, but there are only finitely 
many opportunities to trade as well as finitely many 
traders. Their example hinges on the assumption that 
information about the asset is not common knowledge. 
In particular, all traders in their example know the as-
set is worth less than its price, but traders are not sure 
whether other traders know this to be true. Thus, an 
investor believes that there might be another trader 
who would be willing to buy the asset from him, even 
if that trader expects to hold the asset to maturity. The 
inefficient allocation of resources is crucial to their 
example as well, for precisely the same reason: It al-
lows traders to believe that the asset might ultimately 
be sold to someone who will not be made worse off 
from buying it.
The possibility that bubbles occur because of some 
underlying economic inefficiency is especially impor-
tant for evaluating the desirability of asset price bub-
bles. If a bubble exists because of some underlying 
inefficiency in the economy, we would need to account 
for how the bubble interacts with this underlying in-
efficiency to assess whether policy intervention is  
desirable. In particular, we would need to determine 
whether eliminating the bubble ameliorates or exacer-
bates this same inefficiency.
Examples where bursting a bubble is 
distinctly undesirable
One point worth noting is that if bubbles arise 
because of an underlying inefficiency elsewhere in 
the economy, it might be possible that bubbles serve 
to mitigate the inefficiency that allows them to exist 
in the first place. In that case, bursting the bubble 
may very well exacerbate the inefficiency and make 
society worse off. We have already seen one example 
of this in Townsend’s model. The key feature of that 
model, as well as of most other monetary models, is 
that there are mutually advantageous trades that for 
various reasons people fail to enter.8 In Townsend’s 
model, the problem is that agents cannot commit to 
trade over time. In particular, rich households would 
like to trade some of the goods they are endowed with 
today for goods they can consume when they are poor 
tomorrow. But this necessitates trading over time: In 
exchange for goods today, a household has to promise 
to provide goods tomorrow. But if it is not possible to 
track down a person in the future or to rely on courts 
to enforce such contracts, these trades will not be  
possible. The virtue of money, or any repeatedly traded 
asset for that matter, is that it can overcome such dif-
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be a future market in which they can trade money  
(or an asset) for goods, there is no need to track down 
the original person with whom they traded their goods. 
As far as each individual is concerned, he supplies 
goods in exchange for an asset that he expects to sell 
later. There is no need to enforce contracts or engage 
in bilateral agreements with people who may be hard 
to track down later. The bubble works to alleviate the 
underlying inefficiency by encouraging the very trades 
that would not take place without it. Bursting the bub-
ble would then limit trade between agents, and house-
holds would be made worse off because they would 
have to face more volatile consumption than if the 
bubble was allowed to persist.
One of the features of the bubble in Townsend’s 
economy is that it never bursts. But in a world where 
a bubble is likely to burst eventually, the relevant choice 
for a policymaker would not be whether to let a bub-
ble persist, but rather whether to hasten its collapse. It 
turns out that allowing for the possibility that a bub-
ble collapses on its own would not change any of the 
implications in a model like Townsend’s, a point em-
phasized in Weil (1987). Weil explored a monetary model 
in which there is a constant probability each period 
that money will lose all of its value. In that model, an 
asset bubble will play a useful role in fostering trades 
that would not occur otherwise for as long as it sur-
vives, and hastening its collapse would still be detri-
mental to the households in that economy. 
Although money is an unconventional example 
of a bubble, the lesson inherent from monetary mod-
els of the type described previously is that bubbles 
may encourage mutually beneficial trades that would 
not have taken place otherwise. To see why these issues 
may have relevance beyond just monetary models, 
consider the following example. One of the distin-
guishing features of most housing markets is that they 
tend to be distorted in various ways by government 
regulations. One common distortion is due to the way 
governments assess home values to determine the 
amount of property taxes homeowners must pay. In 
an economy where housing prices tend to appreciate, 
say, for demographic reasons as demand for housing 
increases, the assessed values of homes that have not 
sold recently often lag behind. This creates an incen-
tive for homeowners to stay put in order to keep their 
tax payments low; if they purchase another home, the 
value will be assessed more accurately and their tax 
bill will rise. But there may be reasons to encourage 
turnover in homeownership. For example, suppose that 
certain neighborhoods in the city are inherently suited 
to families with young children. If these areas do not 
have well-developed rental markets, the dampening 
effect on turnover would mean that too few of the houses 
in these areas would be purchased by families with 
young children for whom these areas are ideal. Any-
thing that serves to encourage greater turnover in ho-
meownership despite these tax distortions thus has 
the potential to improve the allocation of resources 
within the city.
A bubble in the housing market is one example 
of something that can serve to increase turnover in 
homeownership. In particular, a bubble implies that 
the price of a house exceeds its fundamental value. 
For owners to be willing to purchase such a house, they 
must anticipate selling the house in the future. Thus, 
a bubble in the housing market may end up generat-
ing turnover that would not have occurred otherwise. 
Of course, a bubble in the housing market could be 
distorting in and of itself, for example, by encourag-
ing excessive building in particular neighborhoods. 
What the example reveals is that if there is some in-
herent distortion that precludes agents from trading 
resources efficiently, there may be certain negative 
consequences to bursting a bubble.
Bubbles and resource diversion
Even if bubbles serve to facilitate trades that 
would not occur otherwise, one of the commonly cited 
reasons for why it would be desirable to burst them is 
that they divert resources from other productive uses. 
The idea is that since agents respond to prices when 
they undertake economic decisions, a price that devi-
ates from the true value of an asset can distort the in-
centives of agents and lead to suboptimal allocation 
of resources. I now consider this possibility. Once 
again, the main lesson from the economic literature 
on bubbles is that it is important to take into account 
the conditions that allow a bubble to emerge in the 
first place when determining the likely benefits from 
bursting the bubble. 
The earliest example of a model in which bubbles 
can affect the allocation of resources is Diamond (1965). 
His model builds on the earlier work in monetary the-
ory by Samuelson (1958). Instead of an endowment 
economy, Diamond considers a production economy 
in which it is possible to think about how the presence 
of an overvalued asset affects the allocation of resources 
for production. Diamond assumes households have 
two options when saving: They can hold capital, which 
can then be used in production, or they can hold an 
intrinsically worthless asset that pays no dividends. 
Since this asset trades at a positive price in the model, 
it can be viewed as a bubble. A bubble can emerge in 
this framework because Diamond assumes there are 
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which is one of the conditions Tirole (1982) ruled out 
when deriving his non-existence result. However, even 
with infinitely many traders, it turns out that a bubble 
can only emerge if the economy grows at least as fast 
as the bubble, since households need to be able to af-
ford to purchase the asset as it increases in value. In 
the model, the bubble grows at the rate of interest. 
Hence, a necessary condition for a bubble to exist is 
that the economy grows faster than the rate of inter-
est. But it is well known that this condition indicates 
that resources are allocated inefficiently, since such  
a low interest rate implies there must be too much 
capital accumulation. Thus, once again, a bubble ex-
ists when the underlying economy exhibits some in-
efficiency, although the inefficiency is not the 
essential element that gives rise to the bubble.
Since households can hold their wealth either in 
the bubble asset or capital, the emergence of a bubble 
will necessarily crowd out capital accumulation. Thus, 
the emergence of the bubble will divert resources from 
other activities. But in Diamond’s economy, a bubble 
can only exist when capital accumulation is already 
excessive. That is, bubbles will only divert resources 
away from capital in his economy if there is too much 
capital accumulation to begin with. Hence, the condi-
tions that are necessary for a bubble to exist imply 
that resources would have been allocated inefficiently 
without the bubble, and so reallocation is actually so-
cially beneficial. Tirole (1987) strengthens this intu-
ition by showing that in Diamond’s environment, the 
presence of an “asymptotic” bubble—that is, a bubble 
whose value grows at the same rate as the rest of the 
economy—necessarily implies the economy is con-
sumption-efficient. Thus, the presence of a bubble in 
this model should be seen as evidence of an efficient-
ly operating economy, not as something undesirable. 
Work by Abel et al. (1989) mentioned earlier raises 
doubts that the U.S. economy exhibits excessive capi-
tal accumulation. The scenario envisioned in Diamond’s 
model may therefore be of little relevance in practice. 
However, it is a useful illustration of the more gener-
al point that for a bubble to emerge in the first place 
may require the presence of distortions elsewhere in 
the economy, and so we need to think carefully about 
how any diversion of resources due to bubbles inter-
acts with these distortions.
Although in Diamond’s model a bubble can only 
exist when there is excessive capital accumulation, 
the more important feature of this model that allows  
a bubble to emerge is the assumption of infinitely 
many traders. Indeed, subsequent work by Saint-Paul 
(1992), Grossman and Yanagawa (1993), and King and 
Ferguson (1993) shows that one can modify the Diamond 
model so that a bubble exists when capital accumula-
tion is not excessive. All three do so by introducing 
an externality in capital accumulation. That is, they 
assume that the productivity of a firm depends on the 
economy-wide average level of capital. This assump-
tion relies on a broad interpretation of capital that in-
cludes not only physical capital but also organization 
and knowledge capital. The more firms in the economy 
accumulate useful knowledge, the more likely remain-
ing firms are to use this accumulated knowledge base 
to improve their own productivity. Because of this 
externality, the level of capital in the economy is inef-
ficiently low rather than excessive. In this case, the 
emergence of a bubble on an intrinsically useless asset 
would divert resources from already scarce capital. 
This suggests an environment in which it might be 
desirable to burst bubbles after all. But as pointed out 
by Grossman and Yanagawa (1993), once a bubble 
emerges in their model, even though bursting the 
bubble will allow for more capital accumulation, it 
will necessarily make some households worse off. The 
reasoning is as follows. In their model, households 
buy assets when they are young to save for retirement, 
which they then sell when they are old to finance con-
sumption. Bursting a bubble will therefore erode the 
retirement savings of those older households that  
happen to hold the asset at the time the bubble is burst. 
In order to make sure no household is left worse off  
after bursting the bubble, we would need to compen-
sate these older households for their loss out of current 
resources. But the resources we would need to com-
pensate older households are the same resources that 
would have been released for capital accumulation. 
Essentially, society can benefit from bursting the bubble 
only if the resources that younger households would 
have transferred to older households by buying the 
older households’ overvalued assets are reallocated  
to capital accumulation.
Interestingly, subsequent work by Oliver (2000) 
argues that even when we allow for externalities that 
imply there is too little capital accumulation, there may 
be bubbles that serve to mitigate the underaccumula-
tion of capital rather than exacerbate it. His key insight 
is that the bubble has to be tied to the right asset. While 
it is true that a bubble on an asset that substitutes away 
from capital would exacerbate the underprovision of 
capital, a bubble associated with capital would en-
courage greater capital accumulation by increasing 
the return to holding capital. Proceeding to burst such 
a bubble would make society as a whole worse off, 
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When would bursting a bubble be 
theoretically desirable?
So far, I have presented several theoretical models 
of bubbles in which bursting a bubble is distinctly un-
desirable, since doing so either exacerbates some under-
lying inefficiency or makes only some households better 
off while making some others worse off. Are there 
situations in which bursting an asset bubble would 
make all households better off, assuming the bubble 
could be accurately identified and deflated without af-
fecting other variables? In Grossman and Yanagawa’s 
(1993) model, the answer is no: The only way to make 
households better off by eliminating the bubble is to 
take resources from some traders and reallocate them 
in a more efficient way. But a key feature of this 
model is that by the time the gains from a more effi-
cient use of resources are realized, those whose re-
sources were seized are already gone and cannot be 
compensated. One can potentially make a case that 
bursting bubbles is desirable, assuming one can deal 
with the practical issues of implementing such a poli-
cy, if it were somehow possible to compensate those 
who are hurt from the fall in asset prices. 
One possibility is to compensate the original own-
ers of the asset with some delay after all. In Grossman 
and Yanagawa’s model, the problem is that by the 
time the benefits of bursting the bubble are realized, 
the original owners—older households in the model 
that are already retired—are dead. Although this stark 
result is due to the stylized nature of the overlapping 
generations model Grossman and Yanagawa use, it is 
true empirically that older households tend to own a 
large fraction of total wealth; therefore, there is genu-
ine concern that bursting a bubble may not benefit many 
of the households that suffer a capital loss when the 
bubble is burst. One way to provide redress to these 
households is to compensate their heirs. This idea is 
not so far-fetched. Households save into retirement  
in part because they intend to leave some of their 
wealth to their children. Thus, it could very well be 
that bursting the bubble and wiping out the savings  
of older households affect them most by denying 
them the opportunity to leave a large inheritance for 
their children. But if younger households are better 
off once resources are freed up for capital accumula-
tion, they might be better off on the whole despite 
having a smaller inheritance. 
Although appealing to intergenerational linkages 
this way seems reasonable, one has to be careful in 
pursuing this argument. The reason is that while tak-
ing into account the possibility that households care 
about their future generations allows us to compensate 
those who are hurt when asset prices fall, it may also 
make bubbles less likely to occur in the first place.  
A key feature of the Grossman and Yanagawa model 
is that each household has a finite time horizon, which 
does play a role in allowing the bubble to emerge. 
Once we allow traders to care about future generations, 
their time horizon would effectively become infinite. 
If each generation cares about the well-being of its 
own children, households would effectively behave in 
the best interests of their family dynasties. But as 
Santos and Woodford (1997) point out, as long as 
even some households with a nonnegligible fraction  
of the economy’s total wealth have an infinite hori-
zon, bubbles might no longer be possible. Problems 
arise not because individuals have an infinite horizon 
per se, but because they have an infinite horizon and 
a positive share of total wealth. As Weil (1989) dem-
onstrated, bubbles may emerge when agents are infi-
nitely lived if there is enough entry of new dynasties 
that are not linked to pre-existing families, so that in 
the limit the fraction of aggregate wealth of each dy-
nasty becomes negligible.
An alternative argument for why bursting a bub-
ble might make society as a whole better off is if 
bursting the bubble yields immediate benefits as op-
posed to only in the distant future, and these benefits 
can in principle be used to compensate those who 
take a capital loss when the bubble bursts. The key 
feature of the Grossman and Yanagawa model is that 
bursting the bubble releases resources for capital ac-
cumulation, but capital is only productive with some 
delay. If bursting the bubble freed up resources that 
could be more immediately put to use, it might be 
possible to compensate the owners of the bubble asset 
without much delay. Suppose we modify the Grossman 
and Yanagawa model so that maintaining the bubble 
uses up current resources—that is, buying a bubble 
requires using up some labor and capital resources. 
For example, the excess trading that occurs when an 
asset is overvalued might require labor resources 
(real estate agents or stock brokers) that could alter-
natively be used for production. If bursting the bubble 
releases these resources for production fairly quickly, 
there may be enough new resources to compensate 
the original owners of the asset who lose out when 
the value of their assets collapses.
As a final note, much of the preceding discussion 
is based on the notion that bursting bubbles could be 
theoretically desirable because a bubble diverts re-
sources from more productive uses. Another potential 
argument for bursting bubbles is that it might be better 
to contain asset prices while a bubble is still small 
than to wait until it becomes large. Intuitively, the 57 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
1The NASDAQ-100 is an index that corresponds to the value of the 
National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation 
system’s 100 largest nonfinancial securities, based on market 
capitalization.
2More generally, a bubble is a situation in which the price of the  
asset deviates from its fundamental value, be it because the price 
exceeds the fundamental value or falls short of it. The latter case  
is sometimes referred to as a negative bubble. In this article, I focus 
on positive bubbles, which more closely correspond to the asset 
bubbles that figure most prominently in policy discussions.
3For example, McGrattan and Prescott (2004) argue that the stock 
market prior to the 1929 crash was if anything undervalued and 
that the subsequent crash could have been caused by monetary or 
regulatory policy. Garber (1989) argues that rare tulip varieties in 
seventeenth-century Netherlands were highly prized, justifying the 
high price of bulbs that could produce these exceptional varieties. 
Garber (1990) goes on to argue that the Mississippi and South Sea 
episodes might not correspond to bubbles either. For a more compre-
hensive discussion of the Mississippi Company, see Velde (2003), 
who, among other things, discusses whether the stock was overval-
ued and should rightly be viewed as a bubble.
4Note that in a period of general price deflation, a dollar costs less 
in terms of goods than it will purchase in the future. In that case, 
holding money would in fact earn a capital gain. But the argument 
that money can be viewed as a bubble is independent of any over-
all trends in the general price level.
5In particular, households in Townsend’s (1980) model cannot lend 
their money holdings to others who need money and charge them 
some interest rate. In practice, this option may be available to house-
holds; for example, most depository institutions offer some interest 
on checking accounts. Thus, money may earn some dividends rath-
er than strictly zero, as is so starkly assumed in the model.
6Formally, this is known as the common priors assumption. For  
a discussion on the merits and validity of this assumption, see  
Morris (1995).
7In addition to violating at least one of Tirole’s (1982) assumptions, 
a necessary condition for bubbles to exist is that traders are short-
sales constrained. Since a bubble is worth more than the present 
discounted value of the dividends it yields, agents can make arbitrage 
profits by selling short shares of the bubble and then using the pro-
ceeds they earn to pay out dividends, pocketing the leftover as 
profit. If people were free to sell assets short, the threat of infinite 
supply would ensure that the price of an asset could never exceed 
its fundamental value, thus precluding the possibility of a bubble.
8An excellent collection of papers on the theory of money is Kareken 
and Wallace (1980). A follow-up compendium of more recent ad-
vances was published in a special May 2005 issue of the International 
Economic Review.
asset bubbles are not really bubbles as economists  
define them. Of course, if we can be assured that bubbles 
are unlikely to ever occur, there is little reason for 
policymakers to worry about the prospect of reining 
them in if they were to occur. Yet, as the work reviewed 
in this article suggests, bubbles can occur once we 
depart from ideal conditions, and so there is some 
merit to contemplating whether and how policymak-
ers should respond to a bubble. At the same time, the 
conditions that allow bubbles to exist may have im-
portant implications for the desirability of such policies. 
Equating asset prices with their fundamental values—
a feature that is desirable in classical models—may 
no longer be possible or desirable once we depart from 
such ideal conditions. Thus, one has to be careful not 
to rely too much on the intuition that it is always de-
sirable to have the price of an asset reflect its true worth—
an idea that implicitly assumes perfectly functioning 
markets—to guide policy. Simply put, the emergence 
of a bubble may signal that the economy already suf-
fers from certain structural problems, and then one 
has to be careful to distinguish whether bursting the 
bubble can mitigate or exacerbate these problems. 
larger the bubble, the larger the price collapse and 
spillover effects on output and consumption would be 
when the bubble bursts. In other words, bubbles might 
contribute to making the economy more volatile than 
necessary. This is an intriguing idea, although there is 
little formal work that can help to evaluate this partic-
ular argument.
Conclusion
In this article, I have argued that in addition to 
the practical difficulties associated with identifying 
asset bubbles and using monetary policy to affect  
asset prices, there are theoretical reasons why policy-
makers should proceed with caution if they intend to 
combat asset bubbles.
In many ways, economic theory views bubbles 
as oddities, since under ideal conditions they would 
never occur. More precisely, if traders are rational 
and markets operate efficiently, as is typically assumed 
in various economic models, the existence of bubbles 
can be ruled out explicitly. Some economists, most 
notably Garber (1990), have argued on this basis that 
most of the commonly cited historical examples of  
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